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The scope and limits of unconscious processing are a
matter of ongoing debate. Lately, continuous flash
suppression (CFS), a technique for suppressing visual
stimuli, has been widely used to demonstrate
surprisingly high-level processing of invisible stimuli. Yet,
recent studies showed that CFS might actually allow low-
level features of the stimulus to escape suppression and
be consciously perceived. The influence of such low-level
awareness on high-level processing might easily go
unnoticed, as studies usually only probe the visibility of
the feature of interest, and not that of lower-level
features. For instance, face identity is held to be
processed unconsciously since subjects who fail to judge
the identity of suppressed faces still show identity
priming effects. Here we challenge these results,
showing that such high-level priming effects are indeed
induced by faces whose identity is invisible, but critically,
only when a lower-level feature, such as color or
location, is visible. No evidence for identity processing
was found when subjects had no conscious access to any
feature of the suppressed face. These results suggest
that high-level processing of an image might be enabled
by—or co-occur with—conscious access to some of its
low-level features, even when these features are not
relevant to the processed dimension. Accordingly, they
call for further investigation of lower-level awareness
during CFS, and reevaluation of other unconscious high-
level processing findings.
Introduction
In the course of a typical day, humans encounter
numerous stimuli that are detected, identiﬁed, and put
into context within a few hundred of milliseconds.
Remarkably, several recent studies demonstrated that
many of these high-level processes can take place even
when the stimuli are invisible: observers were found to
read and process the meaning of words (Abrams,
Klinger, & Greenwald, 2002; Armstrong & Dienes,
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2013; Costello, Jiang, Baartman, McGlennen, & He,
2009; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998; Lamy,
Mudrik, & Deouell, 2008; Reber & Henke, 2012);
process semantic incongruencies in written sentences
(Sklar et al., 2012) and visual scenes (Mudrik, Breska,
Lamy, & Deouell, 2011); perform arithmetic operations
(Bahrami et al., 2010; Garcia-Orza, Damas-Lopez,
Matas, & Rodriguez, 2009; Ric & Muller, 2012);
categorize faces (Barbot & Kouider, 2012; Stein, Senju,
Peelen, & Sterzer, 2011b) and other objects (Almeida,
Mahon, Nakayama, & Caramazza, 2008; Poscoliero,
Marzi, & Girelli, 2013); process emotions (Adams,
Gray, Garner, & Graf, 2010; Faivre, Berthet, &
Kouider, 2012; Yang, Zald, & Blake, 2007); and
exercise executive functions (Capa, Bustin, Cleeremans,
& Hansenne, 2011; Lau & Passingham, 2007; van Gaal,
Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008) in
the absence of perceptual awareness (for reviews, see
Kouider & Dehaene, 2007; Lin & He, 2009; Mudrik,
Faivre, & Koch, 2014; van Gaal & Lamme, 2012).
Many of these studies used a technique called
continuous ﬂash suppression (CFS; see Tsuchiya &
Koch, 2005) to render the critical stimuli invisible. In
CFS, a stimulus presented to one eye is suppressed by
rapidly changing patterns presented to the other eye.
Unconscious processing of the suppressed stimulus is
typically demonstrated by either ﬁnding an indirect
effect of the suppressed stimuli on the processing of a
subsequent target (Adams et al., 2010; Bahrami et al.,
2010; Barbot & Kouider, 2012; Costello et al., 2009;
Faivre et al., 2012; Sklar et al., 2012) or by ﬁnding a
difference in the time it takes different types of stimuli
to break suppression (breaking CFS or b-CFS measure;
Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007; Mudrik et al., 2011; Sklar
et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2007). Such measures indicate
that subjects were indeed able to process the critical
feature, despite being unaware of the suppressed
stimulus.
Yet, a few recent reports hint that CFS does not
prevent awareness in an all-or-none fashion. Instead,
some low-level features like color (Hong & Blake, 2009)
or location (Zadbood, Lee, & Blake, 2011) can escape
suppression and become visible, even when subjects
report not seeing the stimulus itself or any part of it and
thus, are not attributable to piecemeal rivalry; for
example, reporting seeing a ‘‘shapeless cloud’’ of color,
which is not perceived as part of a stimulus (Hong &
Blake, 2009), or knowing that something was there
without knowing what it was (Zadbood, Lee, & Blake,
2011). Such awareness of low-level features during CFS
is more likely to occur with small overlaps between the
visual features of the suppressing and the suppressed
stimuli (Hong & Blake, 2009; Yang & Blake, 2012).
Critically, such low-level awareness may not be
detected and analyzed by researchers, as most studies
control for the visibility of the feature of interest only,
rather than the visibility of other, lower-level features.
For instance, when investigating unconscious process-
ing of face identity, researchers only showed that
subjects were at chance in discriminating their fame or
identity (Barbot & Kouider, 2012), and similarly, when
probing categorization, researchers only showed that
subjects were at chance in discriminating their category
(Almeida et al., 2008, experiments 2–6). Notably,
controlling for the feature of interest is well accepted in
the ﬁeld, following extensive discussions in the litera-
ture of unconscious processing (e.g., Reingold &
Merikle, 1988; Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004).
However, it does not exclude the possibility that
awareness of low-level features has a role in driving
unconscious effects at higher levels.
Only a few CFS studies controlled for lower-level
awareness. This was either done by using a detection
task, where subjects are not asked about the feature of
interest, but are rather prompted to determine whether
a stimulus had been presented or not (i.e., stimulus
detection, see Almeida et al., 2008, experiment 1;
Amihai, Deouell, & Bentin, 2011), or by asking subjects
to make a discrimination about a lower level feature
than the one being tested (e.g., probing unconscious
semantic processing while controlling for chance-level
performance on a feature detection task; Kang, Blake,
& Woodman, 2011). Interestingly, these studies failed
to demonstrate unconscious processing of their feature
of interest (i.e., race and gender of faces, see Amihai et
al., 2011; meaning of words, see Kang et al., 2011; see
also Almeida et al., 2008, experiment 1). Note that
among the studies that controlled for the feature of
interest rather than low-level awareness, two also failed
to ﬁnd high-level processing (Faivre & Koch, 2014;
Ludwig, Sterzer, Kathmann, Franz, & Hesselmann,
2013). Although these studies allude to the possibility
that high-level unconscious processing may depend
on—or be correlated with—the visibility of low-level
features, this interpretation has yet to be tested directly.
In this study we therefore set out to examine whether
awareness of low-level features serves as a gating
mechanism for the processing of higher-level features.
More speciﬁcally, we tested whether unconscious
processing of invisible high-level facial features can
occur when low-level ones are also invisible, following
Barbot and Kouider’s (2012) ﬁndings of unconscious
identity processing. To that end, we used a priming
paradigm, in which the presentation of a prime
stimulus facilitates the processing of a subsequent
target stimulus, if the two are related. In two
independent experiments, we compared unconscious
processing of face identity, as indexed by identity
repetition priming, when subjects were either unaware
of any stimulus feature (unconscious trials), or aware of
low-level features like face color in Experiment 1 or
location in Experiment 2, but not identity (low-level
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awareness trials). In a separate set of experiments we
established that subjects can be aware of the color or
location of a suppressed face during CFS without
consciously perceiving other facial features like face
orientation or gender, see Appendix 1 in Supplementary
Material.
We hypothesized that if low-level stimulus awareness
is indeed required for, or at least co-occurs with, high-
level processing, then identity priming effects would be
larger or found only in the low-level awareness trials,
even though the color or location of a face is not
informative about its identity.
Experiment 1: Does seeing the color
of suppressed faces modulate
identity priming?
Experiment 1 examined the relationship between
high-level processing as indexed by repetition priming,
and low-level awareness. We probed unconscious
processing of face identity following Barbot and
Kouider (2012; however, note that the faces were
presented in grayscale), while critically adding a trial-
by-trial report of color awareness. We then compared
identity repetition priming when subjects were either
unaware of face color (unconscious trials), or aware of
face color but not identity (low-level awareness trials).
Priming was assessed by comparing reaction times for
categorizing the target face as famous/unknown when
it was preceded by either an identical or a different
famous/unknown face (prime; primes and targets
always belonged to the same fame category. Accord-
ingly, differences in reaction times were compared
within each fame category).
Materials and methods
Subjects
Thirty-ﬁve healthy subjects with normal or correct-
ed-to-normal vision (22 male, 13 female; 35 right-
handed, 23 right eye dominance), aged 18–35 years (M
¼ 25) participated in the experiment. Fifteen subjects
were excluded due to low performance on target fame
discrimination (,85%, implying that they were unable
to efﬁciently categorize the target faces), or high
performance on prime fame in conﬁdence levels 1 and 2
in the control prime-visibility session (.70%, implying
that they were not following instructions regarding
subjective color conﬁdence ratings properly). Akin to
the study by Barbot and Kouider (2012), subjects’
exclusion was relatively high, mainly due to the
challenge of reaching high performance on both target
discrimination and color categorization despite CFS.
However, it is important to note that criteria for
subjects’ exclusion were objective, and orthogonal to
priming effects. In both Experiment 1 and Experiment
2 we aimed at 20 subjects after exclusion, as done in
previous face experiments, and stopped data collection
when we reached this number. Of these 20 subjects, 14
had enough trials (.20) in conﬁdence 1, and 18 had
enough trials in conﬁdence 2. Twelve had enough trials
in both conﬁdence levels.
Stimuli and apparatus
Participants viewed a CRT display (10243 768, 100
Hz), through an adjustable mirror stereoscope attached
to a chin rest at a distance of 57 cm. MATLAB and
Psychtoolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, &
Pelli, 2007; Pelli, 1997) were used to control stimuli
presentation. A black and white dashed frame (9.758 3
9.758) was presented on a gray screen to both eyes to
facilitate binocular fusion. Each participant selected 18
faces (half male and half female) that he or she could
easily recognize from a set of 60 famous faces (actors,
politicians, singers). In addition, 18 unknown faces that
were famous faces from another country (Israel), were
used. Subjects conﬁrmed not recognizing these faces.
This constituted a stimuli bank of 18 famous and 18
unknown faces for each subject, based on his or her
own preferences. The use of famous yet unknown faces
was done to control for differences in facial appearance
and picture quality as compared with famous faces. All
faces were matched for average luminance using the
SHINE toolbox (Willenbockel et al., 2010). Faces were
colored blue or green to allow examination of color
awareness, and were centrally presented (6.88 3 4.38) to
the nondominant eye (eye dominance was assessed by
asking subjects to point at a distant target, cover each
one of their eyes and report when they had experienced
a stronger visual shift; Miles, 1929). Face edges were
blurred by a convolution with a squared Gaussian
elliptical mask (r1¼ quarter of face width, r2¼ half of
face height). CFS patterns were grayscale circles of
random sizes, locations, and luminance and were
presented to the dominant eye at 10 Hz.
A new combined subjective-objective measure of
awareness (SOMA)
We devised a new way to measure subjects’ objective
and subjective level of awareness, so that both
measures were combined into one intuitive test. On
each trial, an array of eight letters composed of four
‘‘B’’ and four ‘‘G’’ letters at varying sizes was presented
after the prime (see Figure 1A). Subjects were asked to
give their objective report (select B or G for blue or
green color, respectively), combined with the related
conﬁdence level. The size of letters represented the
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degree of conﬁdence, with 1 ¼ ‘‘pure guess’’ (smallest
letters), 2¼ ‘‘I think I know the color,’’ 3 ¼ ‘‘I’m sure
about the color,’’ and 4¼ ‘‘I saw a clear part/contour of
the face’’ (largest letters). A random letter was initially
colored blue and subjects used the left and right arrows
to move the blue coloring to the desired letter, and then
conﬁrmed their selection using the space bar. We argue
that the use of SOMA allows for an accurate and
simultaneous measure of awareness at the subjective
and objective levels, as well as type 1 and type 2
measures for signal detection or metacognition pur-
poses (e.g., Jachs, Blanco, Grantham-Hill, & Soto,
2015; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Szczepanowski &
Pessoa, 2007) without any confounds in terms of task
order (i.e., performing the objective measure before or
after the subjective one is known to modulate
performance; Wierzchon, Siedlecka, & Paulewicz,
2014) or memory failure (i.e., when presenting the
objective measure after the subjective one, subjects’
awareness might be underestimated in case they
consciously perceived some of the stimulus, yet failed to
perform the objective task due to forgetting).
Procedure
Experiment 1 included training, priming, and prime-
visibility sessions. In all sessions, trials were self-paced,
and began with the presentation of a small black square
and white frame of matched size to the left and right
eye, respectively, at the fovea. Participants moved the
frames to reach binocular fusion, so that the black
square would ﬁt into the white frame. Then, CFS
stimulation started as described below. Prime and CFS
patterns contrasts were set individually for each subject
based on training performance, with the aim of
reaching a maximal and similar number of conﬁdence 1
and conﬁdence 2 trials. After the ﬁrst block of the
priming session, contrast values were reevaluated and
changed if necessary, and the session restarted.
Training session: The training session included 1–2
blocks of 36 trials. In each trial, the prime face was
presented together with the CFS patterns for 1.5 s,
while its contrast was linearly ramped up during the
ﬁrst second. Subjects then reported the prime color and
their conﬁdence of that report using the combined
objective and subjective measure of awareness (SO-
MA). Feedback was presented on screen (the chosen
letter turned green in correct trials or red in incorrect
trials) for 400 ms.
Priming session: The subsequent priming session was
aimed at evaluating face identity processing at different
levels of stimulus visibility. It included 14 blocks of 36
trials. Half of the trials within each block were
repetition trials (identical prime and target) and half
were nonrepetition trials (different prime and target of
the same fame category and gender). Half were of
famous faces, and half of unknown faces. Fame and
repetition were pseudorandomized across trials.
Figure 1. Experimental paradigm. (A) Experiment 1, priming session. A green or blue colored prime face was presented for 1.5 s
during CFS (its contrast was ramped up during the first second). A red colored target face was then presented for 0.7 s, followed by a
question mark. Subjects indicated as quickly as possible if it was a famous or an unknown face by pressing one of two buttons.
Subsequently, subjects reported the color of the prime face and their confidence on a combined scale (SOMA; see Materials and
methods) ranging from ‘‘pure guess’’ (smallest letter) to ‘‘saw a clear part of the face’’ (biggest letter). (B) Experiment 1, prime-
visibility session. Here a red colored mask (average face) appeared on screen for 0.7 s, followed by a ‘‘famous’’? or ‘‘unknown’’?
question about the prime face (question was randomly chosen in each trial), for which subjects replied yes or no. Subjects then
reported the color of the prime face and their confidence on the same SOMA scale.
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In each trial, a prime face was presented together
with the CFS patterns for 1.5 s, while its contrast was
linearly ramped up during the ﬁrst second. The prime
face was followed by a red target face presented to the
nondominant eye for 700 ms (Figure 1A), sized to be
20% bigger than primes (8.28 3 5.28) to avoid
retinotopic overlap between the prime and the target.
Similar to the primes, the edges of the targets were
blurred using an elliptical mask. Subjects were asked to
classify the target as famous or unknown (by pressing
the ‘‘F’’ or ‘‘V’’ buttons, respectively; Figure 1A). After
the target, a black question mark appeared and turned
red after 500 ms. Subjects were encouraged to respond
as quickly as possible, preferably before the question
mark turned red. After fame categorization, subjects
indicated the color of the prime and rated their
conﬁdence using the SOMA.
Prime-visibility session: Finally, the prime-visibility
session was aimed at assessing subjects’ access to fame
information at different levels of awareness. It included
four blocks of 36 trials. CFS stimulation was now
followed by a 700 ms presentation of a red mask
composed of the average of the 36 faces used. Then,
one of two possible questions randomly appeared:
‘‘famous’’? or ‘‘unknown’’? and subjects answered yes
or no (up and down arrow keys, respectively; Figure
1B). Question randomization was aimed at minimizing
unconscious effects of stimulus-response mapping
(Damian, 2001). After fame categorization, subjects
reported prime color and their conﬁdence using the
SOMA.
Results
Color-fame separation
Subjects classiﬁed their categorization of prime
color as a ‘‘pure guess’’ (conﬁdence 1; unconscious
trials) in 35.0% of the trials, as ‘‘I think I saw the color’’
(conﬁdence 2; low-level awareness trials) in 48.2% of
the trials, as ‘‘I’m sure about the color’’ (conﬁdence 3)
in 10.8% of the trials, and as ‘‘saw a clear part/contour
of the face’’ (conﬁdence 4) in 6.0% of the trials. Given
the relatively low number of conﬁdence trials 3 and 4
(our threshold setting procedure was purposely de-
signed to maximize the number of conﬁdence 1 and 2
trials, while ignoring the number of conﬁdence 3 and 4
trials), and, since our experimental question pertained
to unconscious (conﬁdence 1) versus low-level aware-
ness (conﬁdence 2), all conﬁdence 3 and 4 trials were
discarded from the analysis (16.8% of total trials).
Conﬁdence 1 trials coincided with a low, but
signiﬁcantly higher than chance-level performance for
color categorization, M ¼ 56.2%, SD ¼ 7.6%, t(13) ¼
3.08, p¼ 0.009, 95% CI [51.9, 60.6]. To investigate the
origins of such performances above chance level, we
conducted binomial distribution tests at the individual
subject level, using the number of visibility 1 trials for
each subject. This showed that only 4 subjects out of 14
were above chance (with p , 0.05). In these subjects,
better than chance performance might have stemmed
from unconscious processes, or from some residual
awareness. We further address this possibility below,
when describing priming results.
Conﬁdence 2 trials (rated as ‘‘I think I know the
color’’) corresponded to a much higher performance for
color categorization, M ¼ 78.9%, SD ¼ 10.0%, t(17) ¼
12.25, p , 0.0001, 95% CI [73.9, 83.9]. Crucially, prime
color categorization was independent from prime fame
categorization, tested in the prime visibility session
(Figure 2A, inset). Prime fame categorization was at
chance for conﬁdence 1 and 2: conﬁdence 1, M ¼
48.2%, SD ¼ 7.0%, t(12) ¼0.94, p ¼ 0.36, 95% CI
[43.9, 52.4]; conﬁdence 2, M¼ 52.3%, SD¼ 6.1%, t(17)
¼ 1.60, p ¼ 0.13, 95% CI [49.3, 55.3]; no signiﬁcant
difference in accuracy at conﬁdence 1 and conﬁdence 2:
Welch two sample t test, t(22.56)¼1.71, p¼ 0.10. This
conﬁrms that at conﬁdence 2, subjects had access to the
color of the suppressed faces while having no infor-
mation about their fame; paired t test between color
and fame performance, t(18) ¼ 11.90, p , 0.001. At
conﬁdence 1, the same paired t test yielded no
signiﬁcant difference, t(12) ¼ 1.82, p¼ 0.09.
However, one could still argue that our visibility test
does not probe the critical feature that drives the
priming effect (i.e., repetition between the identity of
prime and target), as subjects were asked to judge
whether the face was famous or not, rather than to
report the face identity. This concern is strengthened by
recent ﬁndings from our lab, showing that repetition
priming may stem from low-level similarities between
primes and targets, even when the two differ in size
(Faivre & Koch, 2014). To test this claim, we
conducted two control studies (one for Experiment 1
and another for Experiment 2) that probed subjects’
discrimination of prime identity. Subjects were pre-
sented with two faces, and were asked to indicate which
of the two was the prime, as done by Barbot and
Kouider (2012). In line with the results of Experiments
1 and 2, subjects’ performance was at chance (see
Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material).
Priming effects for confidence levels 1 and 2
Overall, subjects categorized the target as famous/
unknown with high accuracy, M ¼ 94.1%, SD ¼ 4.0%,
95% CI [92.4, 95.9], and an average reaction time of 810
ms, SD¼ 110 ms, 95% CI [762, 858]. Trials in which the
target was erroneously categorized, or with a reaction
time ,300 ms or .2000 ms (Ratcliff, 1993) were
excluded (6.8% of total trials). To assess the priming
effect, we compared subjects’ reaction times in trials in
which the target and prime faces were identical with
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trials where they were different, in each fame category
(famous or unknown) and for each conﬁdence level.
Accordingly, a 23 23 2 repeated measures ANOVA
was run on subjects’ reaction times with repetition
(same/different prime and target), fame (famous/
unknown prime), and conﬁdence about color (‘‘pure
guess’’/‘‘think’’) as factors. An inverse transformation
of reaction times was performed to respect the
normality assumption for analyses of variance (Kol-
mogorov-Smirnov test, D ¼ 0.07, p ¼ 0.53). Subjects
that had ,20 trials at a given conﬁdence level were
omitted from the analysis for that conﬁdence level.
Main effects of fame, F(1, 18) ¼ 13.17; p¼ 0.002,
partial g2¼ 0.42, and of conﬁdence, F(1, 11)¼ 10.1, p¼
0.009, partial g2¼ 0.48, were found, reﬂecting
respectively that participants categorized famous faces,
M ¼ 794 ms, SD¼ 115 ms, 95% CI [766, 823], more
rapidly than unknown ones,M¼ 839 ms, SD¼ 111 ms,
95% CI [812, 866], and that they were faster when their
conﬁdence about prime color was 2, M¼ 796 ms, SD¼
119 ms, 95% CI [769, 825], compared to 1,M¼ 842 ms,
SD¼ 104 ms, 95% CI [815, 869]. Most importantly, we
found a triple interaction between fame, conﬁdence,
and repetition, F(1, 11) ¼ 6.77, p ¼ 0.025, partial g2¼
0.38.
Paired comparisons within subjects who met the
selection criteria (.20 trials) for both conditions
(conﬁdence 1 and 2) revealed that for famous faces, a
prime slowed down subjects’ performance on a
repeated target only when its color was categorized
with a conﬁdence of 2 (M ¼26 ms, SD ¼ 25, t(11) ¼
3.57, p , 0.001, but not with a conﬁdence of 1, M ¼
4 ms, SD¼37, t(11)¼0.39, p¼0.8; one-tailed paired
t test of the difference, t(11) ¼ 1.71, p¼ 0.057. To
further assess whether the lack of priming in conﬁdence
1 stemmed from insufﬁcient sensitivity of our experi-
mental design or from a genuine lack of effect, we
computed Bayes factors, representing the likelihood
ratio of the data under the assumption of the presence
or absence of an effect (referred to as B hereafter; see
Dienes, 2011; Jeffreys, 1961; 0.33 , B , 3 suggests
insensitivity, and B , 0.33 implies no effect). The
priming effects were modeled as normally distributed
with the mean and standard deviation found in
conﬁdence 2. We found that B was equal to 0.22 in
conﬁdence 1, which provides substantial evidence for
the null hypothesis. The same planned comparisons
applied to all subjects (i.e., those who also had trials in
conﬁdence 1 or conﬁdence 2 only) yielded similar
results: conﬁdence 2, M¼19 ms, SD¼ 24 ms, t(17)¼
3.37, p ¼ 0.004, 95% CI [31,7]; conﬁdence 1, M ¼
1 ms, SD ¼ 40 ms, t(13) ¼0.09, p¼ 0.93, 95% CI
[24, 22]; Figure 2A).
The lack of priming effect in conﬁdence 1 trials
further strengthens our interpretation above that these
trials were indeed unconscious, in line with subjects’
Figure 2. Low-level awareness modulates identity-priming effects during CFS. (A) Low-level awareness of color (Experiment 1; n¼ 20).
Average repetition effect for famous faces plotted against the accuracy on color categorization for confidence levels 1 and 2 (red and
blue, respectively). Adaptation effects were found only for low-level awareness (confidence 2) trials. Inset depicts average accuracy
on prime fame categorization for confidence levels 1 and 2. Note that while in unconscious trials, subjects had access to neither color
nor fame information (confidence 1; n¼ 14). In low-level awareness trials (confidence 2; n¼ 18) subjects reported color with high
accuracy (approx. 0.8) but were still at chance for fame categorization. (B) Low-level awareness of location (Experiment 2; n¼ 20).
Average repetition effect for unknown faces plotted for confidence levels 1 (n¼ 10) and 2 (n¼ 14), red and blue, respectively. Again,
adaptation effects were only found for low-level awareness (confidence 2) trials. Error bars denote SEM.
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subjective ratings, and despite their slightly higher than
chance performance. Moreover, even if there was some
residual awareness in some of the trials classiﬁed as
conﬁdence 1, this would go against our ﬁndings as it
would have made it more difﬁcult to ﬁnd a difference in
priming between conﬁdence 1 and 2 trials.
No signiﬁcant effect was found for unknown faces:
conﬁdence 1, M¼12 ms, SD¼ 52 ms; p¼ 0.47, 95%
CI [50, 25]; conﬁdence 2, M¼ 6 ms, SD¼ 57 ms; p¼
0.7, 95% CI [27, 39]. The same ANOVA was run on
accuracies, and yielded no signiﬁcant effects of
repetition (all p . 0.1). Our results thus show a
repetition habituation effect for famous faces when
subjects accessed the color of the face. Such repetition
habituation effects are typical of long-lasting stimuli,
which are thought to induce an overstimulation cost
(Barbot & Kouider, 2012; see also Faivre & Kouider,
2011a for similar results in crowding). Note that when
visible, such long-lasting stimuli induced strong prim-
ing effects in the two aforementioned studies. Unfor-
tunately we were unable to test this hypothesis, as we
had a low number of conscious trials (conﬁdence 4;
only three subjects had at least 20 trials at that
conﬁdence level). In addition, we could not merge trials
with conﬁdence ratings of 3 and 4, as they corre-
sponded to distinct conditions of awareness (‘‘sure
about the color’’ and ‘‘saw a clear part/contour of the
face,’’ respectively).
Discussion
Experiment 1 ﬁrst veriﬁed that low-level awareness
of color during CFS exists beyond simple stimuli (Hong
& Blake, 2009), and can be found for face stimuli as
well. In 45.5% of the trials, subjects were able to detect
the color of the suppressed faces at remarkably high
accuracy (78.9%), despite being at chance for catego-
rizing the face as famous or not, and despite rating their
conﬁdence as relatively low. Most crucially, in Exper-
iment 1 identity priming was only found when subjects
were aware of the color of the suppressed faces, even
though color and identity are two orthogonal features
(i.e., one is not informative for discriminating the
other).
The latter ﬁnding implies that some conscious access
may be needed for high-level processing of suppressed
faces, or at least that the two co-occur. Yet it is possible
that this co-occurrence stems from the fact that
awareness of color pertains to information about the
content of the suppressed stimulus, which in turn may
require relatively extensive processing. Such extensive
processing may also accommodate high-level informa-
tion, leading to the observed co-occurrence. Moreover,
Experiment 1 probed a very speciﬁc situation, in which
a highly salient feature (i.e., color) was suppressed
using black and white Mondrians. It is thus plausible
that our ﬁndings may not apply to other studies. In
addition, it may be that suppressing such a salient
feature requires such a high level of suppression that it
precludes any unconscious processing. Finally, even
though the prime and target stimuli differed in size, the
fact that they were presented at the same screen
location implies that priming may have been driven by
low-level retinotopic similarities rather than the en-
coding of identity per se (see Faivre & Koch, 2014, for
modeling evidence). Hence, the level of processing
involved remains unknown. To address these issues,
Experiment 2 focused on a lower-level feature (loca-
tion) that (a) does not require any special type of
suppressors; (b) does not involve a salient feature; (c)
does not entail any information about the content of
the stimulus, but only to its appearance at a speciﬁc
location; and (d) rules out retinotopic similarities
between the prime and the target.
Experiment 2: Does seeing the
location of suppressed faces
modulate identity priming?
Materials and methods
Subjects
Twenty-seven healthy subjects with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision (15 male, 12 female; 26
right-handed, 21 right eye dominance), aged 18–34
years (M ¼ 25) participated in the experiment. Seven
subjects were excluded due to low performance on
target fame discrimination (,85%) or high perfor-
mance on prime fame in the control prime-visibility
session (.70%). Of these 20 subjects, 10 had enough
trials (.20) in conﬁdence 1, and 14 had enough trials in
conﬁdence 2. Seven had enough trials in both
conﬁdence levels.
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure
The stimuli, apparatus, and procedure of Experi-
ment 2 were identical to those of Experiment 1, except
for the following changes: all images (primes and
targets) were grayscale, with no blurring of edges, and
no resizing of targets, as there was little retinotopic
overlap due to the different locations. Thus, size was
4.78 3 3.18 for all stimuli. Primes were presented at
either 2.68 to the left or to the right side of a white
ﬁxation cross (0.58 overlap of the prime and target
images). Target was centrally presented. The SOMA
was composed of the letters L (for left) and R (for
right). The CFS patterns’ contrast in each trial was
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pseudorandomly assigned to 0.25, 0.5, or 1 to ensure
that subjects would have enough trials in each
conﬁdence level. The priming session included 15
blocks.
Results
Location-fame separation
About one quarter of the trials were classiﬁed as
‘‘pure guess’’ (conﬁdence 1, 27.9%). These trials
coincided with a low, but signiﬁcantly higher than
chance-level, performance for locating the face, M ¼
53.2%, SD¼ 4.3%, t(9)¼ 2.31, p¼ 0.05, 95% CI [50.0,
56.2]. Here also we conducted binomial distribution
tests at the individual subject level, using the number of
visibility 1 trials for each subject. This showed that only
2 subjects out of 10 were above chance (with p , 0.05).
Conﬁdence 2 (‘‘I think I know the location,’’ 39.1% of
total trials), conﬁdence 3 (‘‘I’m sure about the
location,’’ 16.3%), and conﬁdence 4 (‘‘Sure about the
location and saw a part of the face,’’ 16.7%)
corresponded with a much higher performance, conﬁ-
dence 2, M ¼ 82.8%, SD ¼ 9.9%, t(13) ¼ 12.38, p ,
0.001, 95% CI [77.1, 88.6]; conﬁdence 3,M¼98.4%, SD
¼ 0.3%, t(7)¼ 52.1, p , 0.001, 95% CI [96.2, 100.6];
conﬁdence 4,M¼ 99.2%, SD¼ 0.5%, t(4)¼ 210.26, p ,
0.001, 95% CI [98.6, 99.9]. To comply with Experiment
1, all conﬁdence 3 and 4 trials were discarded from the
analysis (33.0% of total trials; here also, only ﬁve
subjects had .20 conﬁdence 4 trials). Like in Exper-
iment 1, fame discrimination in conﬁdence levels 1 and
2 (tested separately, Figure 1B) was at chance:
conﬁdence 1, M¼ 48.9%, SD¼ 7.7%, t(9)¼0.45, p¼
0.66, 95% CI [43.4, 54.4]; conﬁdence 2, M¼ 51.9%, SD
¼ 11.6%, t(13) ¼ 0.61, p ¼ 0.55, 95% CI [45.2, 58.5];
Figure 2B inset). No difference between conﬁdence
levels was found, Welch two sample t test, t(21.93) ¼
0.76, p ¼ 0.46. At conﬁdence 1, no difference was
found between location and fame categorization,
paired t test: t(9)¼ 1.61, p¼ 0.14, while at conﬁdence 2,
performance was higher for the discrimination of
location than of fame, t(13) ¼ 9.87, p , 0.001. An
additional prime-visibility control study, like the one
that was run for Experiment 1, also showed chance
level performance for conﬁdence levels 1 and 2 (see
Appendix 2 in Supplementary Material).
Priming effects for confidence levels 1 and 2
Like in Experiment 1, target accuracy was high,M¼
95.0%, SD ¼ 4.6%, 95% CI [92.8, 97.1], with similar
reaction times,M¼ 777 ms, SD¼ 112 ms, 95% CI [724,
830]. Incorrect trials and outliers were excluded from
analysis based on the same criteria (7.7% of total trials).
A 23 23 2 repeated measures ANOVA was run on
reaction times with repetition (same/different prime
and target), fame (famous/unknown target), and
conﬁdence (‘‘pure guess’’/‘‘think’’) as factors. An
inverse transformation of reaction times was per-
formed, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, D¼ 0.17, p¼ 0.009,
to reduce deviations from normality observed on the
raw data, D ¼ 0.2, p , 0.001. Here again we found a
triple interaction between fame, conﬁdence, and
repetition, F(1, 6) ¼ 11.53, p ¼ 0.01, partial g2 ¼ 0.66.
No other effects reached signiﬁcance (all p values
.0.1). In this experiment, only seven subjects met the
selection criteria for both conﬁdence 1 and conﬁdence
2, preventing us from conducting paired comparisons.
However, unpaired comparisons between all subjects
that met the criteria for each conﬁdence level revealed a
signiﬁcant difference for unknown faces between
priming in conﬁdence 1, M¼ 9 ms, SD¼ 16 ms, t(9)¼
1.70, p¼ 0.12, 95% CI [3, 20], and conﬁdence 2 trials,
M¼21 ms, SD¼ 28 ms, t(13)¼2.78, p¼ 0.02, 95%
CI [37, 5]; Welch two sample t test between
conﬁdence levels, t(21.05)¼ 3.26, p¼ 0.003 (see Figure
2B). In addition, the Bayes factor for priming in
conﬁdence 1 was equal to 0.01, which provides
substantial evidence for the absence of effect in this
condition. Importantly however, these results might
stem from the different number of subjects in conﬁ-
dence 2 (n¼ 14) and conﬁdence 1 (n¼ 10). It is possible
that the lack of priming for conﬁdence 1 trials reﬂects
lack of statistical power rather than the true absence of
an effect. To examine this possibility we ran a
bootstrap analysis. We conducted a post hoc t test for
conﬁdence 2 so that in each iteration, only 10 out of the
14 subjects were randomly chosen (performed for all
possible combinations of 10 out of 14; n¼ 1,001; Figure
3). The distribution of mean effect size varied between
32 ms and6 ms with a peak around21 ms, while
the actual mean effect value in conﬁdence 1 was 9 ms.
No effects were found for famous faces: conﬁdence 1,
M ¼11 ms, SD ¼ 37 ms, p ¼ 0.28, 95% CI [31, 10];
conﬁdence 2, M¼ 12 ms, SD¼ 39 ms, p¼ 0.2, 95% CI
[7, 31].
Finally, an ANOVA analysis with contrast values of
CFS patterns (i.e., 0.25, 0.5, and 1), and conﬁdence
levels (1, 2, and 3) as factors was run on the number of
trials, showing that the strength of CFS inﬂuenced
conﬁdence judgments, F(4, 36)¼ 38.24, p , 0.001,
partial g2¼ 0.81, so that weaker CFS protocol led to
higher conﬁdence judgments. Therefore, the observed
effect is correlated not only with subjects’ awareness
levels, but also with the difference in the physical
properties of the trials. Note, however, that all
conﬁdence levels were obtained at each CFS contrast
(Figure 4), and that Experiment 1 did not suffer from
this confound, since no manipulation of CFS contrast
took place.
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Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated the ﬁndings of Experiment
1, yet with a different low-level feature: location rather
than color. This suggests that the co-occurrence of
awareness of a low-level feature of suppressed stimuli
and the processing of their higher-level features is not
speciﬁc to a certain low-level feature, but may reﬂect a
more general mechanism. Our results imply that during
CFS, high-level processing may co-occur with an
explicit awareness of some low-level features (see
General discussion for possible explanations). Impor-
tantly, the use of location in Experiment 2 further
shows that lower-level awareness coincides with higher-
level processing even when the lower-level feature does
not contain information about the content of the
suppressed stimulus, but only regarding its location in
space.
It is interesting to note that, in both experiments,
subjects performed slightly higher than chance when
discriminating faces’ color and location, even when
they claimed to be completely guessing (conﬁdence 1
trials). This could suggest that they were underesti-
mating their awareness level (i.e., they were aware of
the stimuli but failed to report so due to a conservative
criterion) in all or some of the trials, or that this low but
still higher than chance performance stemmed from
unconscious processes (Abrams & Greenwald, 2000;
Damian, 2001). Note that the former explanation of
residual low-level visibility works against our claim,
making it more likely to ﬁnd an effect in conﬁdence 1
trials than not to ﬁnd it. Crucially, we found no
evidence for high-level processing in conﬁdence 1 trials.
One point that remains unclear though is why the
habituation effect found in conﬁdence 2 trials was
driven by famous faces in Experiment 1 (in line with
most previous studies; Axelrod, Bar, & Rees, 2015),
and by unknown faces in Experiment 2. Currently, the
role of familiarity during unconscious face processing is
still unclear: while most studies found subliminal
priming for famous faces only (Barbot & Kouider,
2012; Faivre & Kouider, 2011b; Henson, Mouchliani-
tis, Matthews, & Kouider, 2008), some others found
weaker priming effects for unknown faces as well
(Kouider, Eger, Dolan, & Henson, 2009). One possi-
bility is that the pattern of results we obtained stems
from the different level of processing probed in each
experiment. Indeed, Experiment 1 required subjects to
process and become aware of information about the
content of the stimulus (i.e., its color), not only of its
appearance at one of two possible locations as in
Experiment 2. In addition, while primes and targets
shared the same retinotopy in Experiment 1, they were
presented at different locations in Experiment 2, which
rules out the fact that priming stemmed from low-level
Figure 3. Bootstrapping analysis for Experiment 2. Distribution
of the bootstrap analysis results for the mean repetition-effect
size for each possible combination of 10 out of 14 (number of
subjects included in the analysis for confidence levels 1 and 2,
respectively) subjects. Gray and red lines denote the original
average effect size for confidence levels 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 4. Distribution of number of trials as a function of CFS
patterns contrast level in the location priming experiment
(Experiment 2). Number of trials in each confidence level
plotted against the three different CFS pattern contrast levels.
Although there is a correlation between contrast and
confidence levels, all three confidence levels trials were
obtained in each of the CFS contrast levels.
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similarities (Faivre & Koch, 2014). Future research will
be needed to clarify the aspect of familiarity in our
results, and the potential effects of the task and of
retinotopic overlap on familiarity processing.
General discussion
Deﬁning consciousness is considered a hard, if not
an impossible task (Crick & Koch, 2003; Edelman,
1989; Searle, 1998; Sutherland, 1989). Yet, it seems that
reaching a proper operational deﬁnition of unconscious
processing is not an easier one (Reingold & Merikle,
1988; Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleere-
mans, 2010; Seth, Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, &
Pessoa, 2008). The predominant contemporary ap-
proach to deﬁning unconscious processing relies on
ﬁnding a signature of a cognitive process while ruling
out that it was consciously accessed. The former
typically involves an indirect measure (e.g., in our case,
priming), while the latter involves a direct measure, so
that conscious access is assessed by asking the observer
to directly report on the stimulus of interest. In this
study, we showed that during CFS, subjects can be
unconscious of a high-level feature of a stimulus (here,
the identity of a face), yet still have access to some of its
lower-level features such as location or color. This
extends the ﬁndings of Hong and Blake (2009) and
Zadbood et al. (2011), by demonstrating that awareness
of low-level and high-level features can be dissociated
also for complex stimuli, such as faces. More impor-
tantly, we found repetition priming effects—previously
reported as evidence for unconscious processing of face
identity—only when subjects had conscious access to
lower-level features of the suppressed faces (i.e., only
when subjects could see the color or location of the
face; conﬁdence 2 trials). When subjects had no access
to any of the faces’ features (conﬁdence 1 trials), no
effect was found. Critically, this was found both for
color, which relates to the content of the stimulus, and
for the location, which bears no information about the
content of the stimulus. Moreover, as opposed to color,
which is a highly salient feature that is not commonly
used in CFS studies, location is not salient and
common to every CFS study; that is, every stimulus is
displayed at a speciﬁc location in space. These results
suggest that the processing of facial identity under CFS
does not occur unless some visual features are accessed
consciously, even though these features do not convey
identity cues.
The fact that CFS allows for low-level awareness,
which in turn may facilitate high-level processing, is of
interest also for those who used CFS as a methodo-
logical tool outside the ﬁeld of consciousness studies.
Such disciplines include other ﬁelds of psychology and
neuroscience including clinical psychology (Sterzer,
Hilgenfeldt, Freudenberg, Bermpohl, & Adli, 2011;
Yang et al., 2011); clinical psychopharmacology (Hoge
et al., 2014); addiction studies (Yan et al., 2009);
learning and conditioning (Pearson, 2012; Raio,
Carmel, Carrasco, & Phelps, 2012; Seitz, Kim, &
Watanabe, 2009); and emotional processing (Almeida,
Pajtas, Mahon, Nakayama, & Caramazza, 2013;
Vizueta, Patrick, Jiang, Thomas, & He, 2012). Given
this wide usage of the CFS paradigm and the
considerable scientiﬁc attention its ﬁndings are receiv-
ing, it is crucial to investigate its mechanisms and better
understand the depth of visual processing it allows (see
Dubois & Faivre, 2014, for a recent special issue on this
topic).
An especially surprising aspect of our results is that
low-level awareness here pertained to features that are
completely irrelevant to the dimension that drove the
effect (i.e., face identity). As opposed to previous
reports of partial awareness of word parts enhancing
word priming (Kouider & Dupoux, 2004), here subjects
could not strategically use the information gained by
some ﬂeeting conscious experiences of color or location
to facilitate identity processing, as these dimensions are
orthogonal. What mechanism could then account for
this phenomenon?
We present two possible explanations. First, it may
be that conscious access to at least some of the features
of a stimulus is required for processing its higher-level
aspects. This implies that the degree of information
processing depends on the degree of conscious access to
the stimulus, as suggested by studies showing qualita-
tive or quantitative differences between conscious and
unconscious processes: Blake, Tadin, Sobel, Raissian,
& Chong (2006); Harris, Schwarzkopf, Song, Bahrami,
& Rees (2011); Hesselmann, Hebart, & Malach (2011);
and Yang, Hong, & Blake (2010). Presumably, some
access to the features of the stimuli (even very low-level
ones) is accompanied by global information sharing
(Dehaene & Changeux, 2011; Dehaene & Naccache,
2001) that is needed for the mechanisms that encode
higher-level features like face identity (Nestor, Plaut, &
Behrmann, 2011). In the absence of any conscious
processing of the stimulus (i.e., not even of its low-level
features), such global information sharing does not
take place, and the processing of higher-level mecha-
nisms does not occur. Similarly, it could be that high-
level processing requires strong or sustained activation
in lower-level stages of the processing, which occurs
only when subjects are aware of these low-level aspects
of the stimulus. Such a sustained activation could then
drive attentional processes that may facilitate high-level
unconscious processing of the stimulus. Accordingly, in
speciﬁc cases where lower-level stages of the processing
are subcortical (e.g., in emotional processing; Whalen
et al., 2004) and can be activated without awareness,
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low-level awareness might not be required for high-
level processing.
Alternatively, the relation between consciousness
and high-level processing may not be one of necessity
but of correlation, so that low-level consciousness is
not required for high-level processing, but only co-
occurs with it. According to hierarchical models of the
visual system (Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999), the
perceptual strength required for a feature to become
visible increases with its complexity (i.e., along the
visual pathways, from face location or color to facial
expression or identity; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997; Zeki
& Bartels, 1998). This increase of perceptual strength
thresholds with stimulus complexity can explain
situations of partial awareness, in which low-level but
not high-level features are accessed consciously
(Kouider, De Gardelle, & Sackur, 2010). Similarly, it
may be that the perceptual strength required for a
feature to be unconsciously processed increases with
its complexity. This would imply that there are two
kinds of thresholds, one for conscious perception of a
feature and the other for its unconscious processing,
and that these two thresholds may be shifted (i.e., the
threshold for consciously perceiving a lower-level
feature X coincides or lies close to the threshold for
unconsciously processing a higher-level feature Y).
Since the quality of stimulus encoding varies between
trials due to ongoing state variations (e.g., Busch,
Dubois, & VanRullen, 2009), the number and
complexity of features that are processed uncon-
sciously or accessed consciously may vary on a trial-
by-trial basis: in trials in which the overall stimulus
representation is very weak, no threshold will be
crossed, so that subjects will report seeing nothing and
no priming will be observed. In trials in which the
stimulus representation is a bit stronger, the threshold
for unconscious (but not for conscious) processing of
a low-level feature will be crossed, leading subjects to
report seeing nothing, while still showing priming for
that low-level feature. In trials in which the stimulus
representation is even stronger, the threshold for
conscious access of a low-level feature and the
threshold for unconscious processing of a high-level
feature can be crossed together, leading to the
situation we observed here, where subjects report
seeing only a low-level feature of the stimulus but
show priming for a higher-level feature. Note that,
according to this view, high-level priming should not
be found without low-level priming, and high-level
awareness should not occur without low-level aware-
ness. To our knowledge, no evidence for such
situations (i.e., high-level but no low-level priming/
awareness) exists in the literature.
Importantly, both accounts seem to imply that high-
level processing is tightly bound with at least some level
of conscious awareness (Dulany, 1997; Eriksen, 1960;
Holender, 1987; Stein, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2011a), either
since the latter is necessary for the former, or since it
co-occurs with it.
We now discuss two limitations of our study. First,
we cannot rule out the possibility that both the
invisibility of low-level features and the absence of
repetition priming effects co-occurred due to a low
signal-to-noise ratio between the prime and the CFS
patterns (e.g., stemming from a lack of attentional
ampliﬁcation, ongoing oscillations before stimulus
onset, fatigue, or change in response criterion).
However, this confound is present in any behavioral
study that measures priming without controlling for
low-level awareness. Thus, irrespective of its origin, the
dissociation between the effect found in conﬁdence 2
trials and the null result in conﬁdence 1 trials should be
taken into account when interpreting CFS studies that
argued for high-level unconscious processing without
controlling for low-level awareness (e.g., Bahrami et al.,
2010; Barbot & Kouider, 2012; Sklar et al., 2012). This
joins the recent criticism of the breaking-CFS (b-CFS)
paradigm (Stein et al., 2011a), which is used by many to
demonstrate high-level processing of invisible stimuli
(for review, see Gayet, Van der Stigchel, & Paffen,
2014).
Second, the results of our study are not conclusive
regarding the validity of other CFS studies. First,
because we only focused on one type of unconscious
processing (face identity), though with two types of
low-level features (color and location). Second, the
data entail some intriguing patterns, which still beg an
explanation (e.g., the differential role of familiarity in
Experiments 1 and 2). Future studies should follow
ours in understanding these patterns, exploring the
involvement of low-level awareness in other higher-
level processes and comparing it to other forms of
partial awareness found in other paradigms: visual
masking (e.g., Kouider & Dupoux, 2004); crowding
(e.g., Freeman & Simoncelli, 2011); attentional blink
(e.g., Elliott, Baird, & Giesbrecht, 2013); and visual
search (e.g., Greene & Oliva, 2009; Rensink, 2004).
Despite these two limitations, the current results
suggest that empirical ﬁndings of unconscious high-
level processing should be more cautiously interpret-
ed. We show that CFS does not necessarily render
stimuli ‘‘invisible’’: it sometimes suppresses awareness
of high-level features of a stimulus while allowing
awareness of lower-level features, and this low-level
awareness might have far reaching effects on the
processing of the suppressed stimulus. Thus, unless
controlled for low-level awareness, previous ﬁndings
obtained with CFS should be put in the appropriate
context, showing that high-level feature processing is
possible without awareness of that feature, not neces-
sarily without any awareness of the stimulus whatsoev-
er. This, according to some, is a strong enough claim
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that sufﬁces for the study of conscious versus
unconscious processing (Dienes & Seth, 2010; Re-
ingold & Merikle, 1988). Alternatively, stricter mea-
sures of awareness can be used in future studies,
controlling not only for the visibility of the feature of
interest but for the visibility of lower-level features as
well, as was indeed done by Hesselmann et al. (2011),
Meng, Cui, Zhou, Chen, & Ma (2012), and others. Yet
again, this may lead to ﬁnding fewer high-level effects
during unconscious processing and, accordingly, may
be considered by some to be an overly strict approach.
This question, which at this point remains open,
further stresses the need for assessing the generality of
our ﬁndings, notably by testing whether other low-
level features (e.g., orientation, size, spatial frequency)
are involved during unconscious processing of other
orthogonal features (e.g., emotional or semantic
contents) rendered invisible by different techniques
(e.g., masking, crowding).
Conclusions
The current study sheds new light on the graded
nature of awareness. While awareness of each feature is
probably all-or-none (Del Cul, Baillet, & Dehaene,
2007; Sergent & Dehaene, 2004), we show that different
stimulus features can emerge into awareness at different
times and are correlated with different levels of
stimulus processing. Previous studies that claimed
unconscious high-level processing during CFS may
accordingly be revisited in search for similar low-level
awareness, given the relations we found between such
awareness and indirect measures of unconscious
processing.
Keywords: continuous ﬂash suppression (CFS),
priming, unconscious processing, partial awareness, face
processing
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